Introduction
The atmosphere interacts with the oceans, continents and the biosphere on a wide range of spatial and temporal scales. In addition, atmospheric circulation transports and redistributes pollutants over large areas, ignoring political or administrative boundaries. Air pollutants can be sources of other environmental issues. The policies related to the atmospheric environment are difficult to dissect from those related to other environmental media and policy areas, including liquid and solid wastes, water, hazardous chemicals, energy, transport, industry, planning and many others. These environmental issues are subject to the same directions and possible conflicts. Accordingly many of the changes relating to the atmospheric environment are paralleled by similar changes in other areas of environmental policy.
The aim of this review is to assess the trends, directions and driving forces of atmospheric environment policy over the last several decades, particularly in developed countries. To a variable extent similar pressures and outcomes can be observed in some developing countries of the world.
In the beginning
Concerns about air pollution have been recorded for millennia and commented upon by authors in ancient Athens and Rome (Brimblecombe, 1987) . Attempts to address air pollution by effective legislation occurred in recent decades. Many countries experienced rapid economic and population growth without significant consideration of the environmental consequences of industrial pollution. This led to a number of air pollution incidents as a consequence of unregulated industrialisation. The public complaints led to Clean Air Acts in various countries. The London smog that caused thousands of premature deaths in 1952 led directly to the Clean Air Act of 1956 in the United Kingdom (UK) (Brimblecombe, 1987) .
The Clean Air Acts in the late 1950s and early 1960s were simple, prescriptive and narrowly focused. They aimed to ensure that specific emissions into the atmosphere did not cause local health impacts beyond a socially acceptable level (Robinson, 1995) . The driving forces varied in different countries and cities. Influential local actors championed action on air pollution in several cities in the late 1950s and early 1960s including Los Angeles and Toronto. In Los Angeles action was pressed by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Los Angeles Times (Gonzales, 2005) , and in Toronto by a local growth coalition especially real estate interests and the local metropolitan newspapers (Temby, 2012) .
At a local, state or province and at national levels, organisations were established to reduce nuisance and local health impacts of priority air pollutants primarily from industrial sources (Robinson, 1995; Williams, 2004) . In the UK there was also some emphasis on emissions from households and coal combustion (Williams, 2004) .
As broad environmental awareness started to develop in the general community in the late 1960s and early 1970s, governments in many developed countries reacted by creating new environmental legislation and environmental protection agencies (EPAs). The EPAs and similar authorities achieved considerable early successes in many countries in the 1960s and 1970s particularly in improving controls on large point sources of emissions using direct regulation of emissions (command and control) (Sumikura, 1998) . In many large cities in developed countries the ambient concentrations of sulphur dioxide and particulate matter fell dramatically (UNEP, 2012) . These simpler, easier, cheaper, first generation challenges were replaced by more complex second generation issues, for example involving trans-boundary long range transport of air pollutants, cross media transfer and impacts on water, land, biodiversity and livelihoods, including acid deposition. This required regional multi-government and multisectoral policy approaches (Hey, 2006) . These challenges were supplemented by global atmospheric environment priorities as third generation complexities included ozone-depleting substances and greenhouse gases. As the tasks and responses became more complex a wider range of government and nongovernment stakeholders became participants in decision-making. Correspondingly, policy approaches to atmospheric environmental issues became much more comprehensive, integrated, inclusive and difficult. The roles of governments in many countries needed to evolve to address these changes. This paper will address the five most prominent forces of change in approaches to atmospheric issues:
1. A broader range of policy instruments is being used with less reliance on command and control instruments and towards the use of a toolbox of other instruments to complement direct regulation, including economic, education and co-regulation instruments based on selecting the best instrument for the particular challenge;
2. Governance is becoming more complex and shared with a range of stakeholders;
3. Approaches to atmospheric environmental issues have become more integrated with other media (water, land, biodiversity, etc.) and include sustainability concerns;
4. The scale of atmospheric environmental issues has evolved from a local and national focus on obvious issues at this scale towards regional and global scales which present considerable governance and political challenges; and,
5.
Leaders in the corporate sector have assumed increased responsibility and accountability, at least partially or in some cases associated with self-interest.
The evolution in policy instruments
In the 1950s and 1960s the priority atmospheric environmental concerns were nuisance and health impacts of smoke and sulphur dioxide emissions from predominantly industrial premises in cities, first generation issues. The policy instrument of choice was direct regulation by governments using licensing of premises and other command and control means. The approach was to control emissions at source by enacting legislation to restrict emissions of specified substances from certain sources to specified concentrations or rates. This process required monitoring and reporting. Enforcement provisions were exercised including penalties or court action.
From the 1970s in some developed countries and later in developing countries the priority shifted towards regulation of area sources and mobile sources. Photochemical smog and vehicle emissions including lead, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides became new priorities and new policy approaches were required. Emissions from transport sources were addressed by clean fuel standards, new vehicle design standards and mandatory inspection and maintenance requirements for in-service vehicles among other approaches. This was part of a move towards management to achieve air quality targets with legislation on emissions forming a means of implementation (Williams, 2004; Longhurst et al., 2009) . It built on existing technology-based controls by adding an effects-based, risk management approach.
Air pollution policy instruments have been progressively integrated over the last decade or two. The legislative policy frameworks are increasingly targeting specific sectors of the economy, including electricity generation, transport, industry and domestic sources (OECD, 2012) . Air quality standards have been focussing on targets for a range of air pollutants. Examples include the United States (US) Clean Air Act, the Canada-US Air Quality Agreement, Clean Air for Europe, and the National Environmental Protection Measure for Air Quality in Australia. In Japan, the Basic Law on Environmental Pollution Control 1967 and the Air Pollution Control Law 1967 were surprisingly effective in reducing air pollution and the most effective instruments were the environmental quality standards (Sumikura, 1998) .
In some cases these measures were highly successful in reducing and preventing emissions of some pollutants to socially acceptable levels although a number of challenges remain to be overcome for some air pollutants and some countries. The most obvious successful example is the dramatic reduction in the concentration of lead in air, but the reductions in concentrations of sulphur dioxide and coarse particulate matter in the air of cities in developed countries were also major achievements. Less successful has been attempts to lower concentrations of particles in large cities of developing countries and reduce nitrogen dioxide and ozone in many countries (UNEP, 2012).
Japan was the first country to regulate for the removal of lead from petrol and the US followed in 1973 (UNEP, 2012). Many European countries followed a decade later (Williams, 2004) . The health outcomes were spectacular. There was a 98% reduction in the percentage of US children 1-5 years of age with elevated levels of lead in blood (>10 mg/dL) from the period 1976 -1980 to the period 1999 -2002 (CDC, 2005 . Studies in many other regions of the world have shown a strong correlation between decreased use of lead in gasoline and reductions in lead in blood (Thomas et al., 1999) . For every US $1 spent to reduce lead hazards, there was estimated to be a benefit of US $17-220 (Gould, 2009 ).
The US Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 established National Ambient Air Quality Standards and amendments in 1977 and 1990 provided a comprehensive framework by establishing major air quality goals relating to criteria pollutants, hazardous air pollutants, ozone depleting sub-stances, reducing acid deposition and improving visibility in wilderness areas. The US EPA studied the benefits and costs of the abatement policies in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and estimated that by 2020 the total life years gained will be 1.9 million and that the benefits outweigh the costs by a ratio of 28-1 (US EPA, 2010).
The European Union (EU) moved from a primary focus on the management of industrial emissions at source towards the management of ambient air quality using air quality standards. Source emissions reductions began in 1980 with EU Directive 80/779/EEC to establish limit and guide values of SO2 and suspended particles. In the next few years new Directives addressed lead and NO2. A series of EU Directives starting with EU Directive 88/76/EEC to reduce vehicle emissions has been considered to be the most important cause of reductions in public exposure to outdoor air pollution in the UK since the Clean Air Act of 1956 (Williams, 2004) .
In 1987 the EU recognised that an emissions oriented and environmental quality objectives approach can shift problems to other media or regions, for example by long range transport of air pollution (Hey, 2006) . Pollution prevention or control was to involve every environmental media and substance of concern and all major environmental impacts of strategic sectors of the economy. The integrated approach was implemented in the UK by the system of Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection Act of 1990.
There has been a gradual move away from direct regulation by governments towards use of a toolbox of other policy instruments, including use of economic instruments, self-regulation, voluntarism, co-regulation and education and information instruments. In part this has been associated with the voluminous set of complex regulations and limited flexibility of direct regulation in achieving some of the more complex goals on atmospheric environmental management. It has also been claimed that direct regulation can be excessively expensive for industry (Gunningham, 2009a) . Enforcement requirements were beyond the human and financial resources of the regulator in some developing countries (Gunningham, 2009a) .
Cost-efficiency is the main advantage of market-based instruments such as emission taxes, tradeable permits, subsidies on abatement and reductions on subsidies that encourage emissions such as some fossil fuel energy price subsidies (Requate and Unold, 2003) . Carefully designed emissions taxes can have many benefits including environ-mental effectiveness, economic efficiency, the ability to raise public revenue, and transparency (OECD, 2010) .
Direct regulation could achieve this by imposing different standards on each emission source according to its marginal emission abatement cost. However, the actual costs are not available to the regulators and this could provide an incentive for companies to overestimate real costs. In contrast market-based instruments can enable a specified overall emissions reduction to be achieved in a cost-effective manner without the need for regulators to decide on the circumstances of individual companies (Stavins, 2003 ).
An additional advantage of market-based instruments is that they can provide an incentive to further reduce emissions over time by using improved emissions control technologies as they become available. Emissions reductions enable permits to be sold if the earnings from the sale of the permits exceed the cost of the emissions reductions (Stavins, 2003) .
Important US examples of emissions trading include the US EPA's emissions trading programme, the leaded gasoline reduction programme, CFC trading, and the SO 2 allowance trading scheme for acid rain control (Stavins, 2003) . The US EPA estimated savings from lead trading exceeded alternative regulatory programmes by about US$250 million per year (US EPA, 1985) . The SO 2 allowance trading scheme for acid rain control resulted in cost savings of about US$153-183 million annually compared with costs of regulatory alternatives (Keohane, 2006) .
Following the successful use of SO2 and lead emissions trading schemes in the US other countries have adopted or trialled related programmes. In particular there is growing interest in their use for the control of emissions of greenhouse gases. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme has helped transform institutional politics and policy making in the EU and its member states with influences at the global level (Zito et al., 2011) . Emission trading schemes have or are about to be introduced in Australia, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, P.R. China, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, several states in the USA and provinces of Canada (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2012).
The reduction or removal of government fuel subsidies, higher fuel taxes, and congestion charges are other examples of market based instruments. In practice many fuel subsidies promote inefficient fuel use and have environmentally harmful unintended consequences. Studies in a sample of 20 countries revealed that expenditure on subsidies for energy in 2007 was about US$310 billion (IEA, 2008) .
Public information tools also have growing roles. Community Right to Know legislation has been enacted in many countries driven in part by strong local demands for laws providing workers and local communities with information on chemical hazards. Requirements for disclosure can motivate affected industries to reduce emissions even in the absence of traditional regulatory controls (Tietenberg, 1998) . The Com-munity Right to Know legislation has been considered to be one of the most significant pieces of environmental legislation in decades in the US (Wolf, 1996) . The US EPA's Toxic Release Information programme provides emissions information for more than 25,000 industrial facilities and about 20 other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have established similar programmes (US EPA, 2012).
The growing influence of stakeholders
In contrast with the simpler first generation issues, climate change involves complex broad societal issues and many of the factors are beyond the control of environmental regulators. The complexity of the relationships among the range of causes and solutions and the high economic and social costs and risks of addressing and not addressing the major issues has made it more challenging to propose measures supported by wide a range of government and non-government stakeholder groups. Most major initiatives proposed are strongly challenged by the self-interests of the various stakeholders.
In response to growing demands of stakeholders for participation in environmental decision-making, many governments improved the range and quality of environmental information available to the public. They also assisted non-government organisations with access, finance and recognition, helping them with input to decision making. Access to information not previously publicly known became available through Community Right to Know legislation. New technologies also assisted the growing availability and sharing of global information and reduced the gap between information held by government agencies and other stakeholders.
Elected leaders in the 1980s and 1990s became less sympathetic to increased regulation and allocated lower budgets and resources for the bureaucracy (Gunningham, 2009a) . In addition, pressures from the corporate sector and civil society led regulators to explore alternatives to traditional regulation and policy development processes.
The concept was to improve the quality of decision-making by improving the quality or range of values and information on which the decisions are based (Kirk and Blackstock, 2011) .
Increasing policy integration
Cross-cutting issues including climate change and sustain-ability can only be effectively addressed by coordinated action, a 'whole of government' approach involving all relevant areas. The traditional specialised hierarchical approach of government departments has each department with authority within its legitimate roles and a consensus exists not to cross departmental boundaries. This approach has been shown to be inadequate to address the policy needs for complex issues that involve many areas of responsibility (Ross and Dovers, 2008; Matthews, 2011) .
The development and effective implementation of policies on cross-cutting issues including climate change are further hampered by the lack of political and institutional authority of the environmental agency in most jurisdictions. Most of the major policy areas that would need to be part of a solution, including economic development, energy, industry, transport, agriculture, treasury, planning and others are led by departments with considerably more power and authority in government decision-making in most jurisdictions than the environment department (Ross and Dovers, 2008; Matthews, 2011) .
To address climate change and other issues many countries have adopted elements of environmental policy integration. The goal is to ensure that environmental issues are reflected in all policymaking (EEA, 2005) . Environmental policy integration requires the creation of new administrative structures and procedures. However, while this approach has received considerable political backing in Europe and a prominent legal status in the EU (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010) , there is little evidence of environmental policy integration strategies being effectively implemented in Europe (EEA, 2005) . The factors preventing implementation appear to be a lack of institutional coordination, lack of links with planning, budgeting and auditing, reliance on 'soft' policy instruments, coordination within governments, resources, and cultures and practices within the bureaucracies (EEA, 2005) . Environmental policy integration has not been embedded into routine practices in governments (Steurer, 2007; Jordan and Lenschow, 2010) .
The reasons for this failure may include that environmental policy integration 'cuts against the grain' of the traditional specialised hierarchical public administrative system. It involves bringing together many agencies across a range of bureaucratic cultures (Ross and Dovers, 2008) .
Studies of the responses of many governments to climate change provide further insight to the failures to organise government structures able to address the key issues. Climate change represents the greatest challenge to traditional concepts of government capacity (Helm and Hepburn, 2009) . The rhetoric of the highest political levels demanded the introduction of new integrated government structures and intra-government processes in the UK to address the key climate change issues. However, the traditional hierarchical model of policy-making has prevailed, institutional reform has been modest and cosmetic and actions are timid (Matthews, 2011) . This highlights the critical disjuncture between current institutional structures of governments and the challenges of addressing complex and fragmented policy issues such as climate change. The current institutional structures are not fit-for-purpose to adequately address these issues (Matthews, 2011) .
The failure to date of environmental policy integration, exemplified by the failures to address climate change and short lived climate forcing agents including methane, ozone and black carbon, clearly demonstrate the failures of governance in relation to complex, cross cutting atmospheric environmental issues.
The growing implementation of corporate environmental policies
The corporate sector experienced a rapid growth in the number and complexity of regulations concerning emissions of air pollutants in many countries from the early 1970s. When the political climate was receptive the corporate sector encouraged governments to reduce the burden of regulation and to complement it with the use of other instruments including a range of voluntary and self-regulatory programmes.
At the same time the growing concern of stakeholders in relation to hazardous emissions, greenhouse gases and other air pollutants, supported by Community Right to Know legislation have heightened the risks to the corporate brand of negative media reporting. A growing number of companies face market and value chain pressures from customers, shareholders, financial markets, insurers and staff to reduce emissions and risks. The expectations of regulators and stakeholders have been influential in changing corporate environmental policies and strategies (Vormedal, 2012) .
Large corporations with significant environmental risks have increasingly adopted a range of voluntary and selfregulatory tools. These include commitments to environmental or sustainability policies, the adoption and certification of environmental management systems (EMS) such as the International Organisation for Standardization's ISO 14001 or the environmental management and audit system (EMAS).
EMS is a voluntary instrument that can work alongside direct regulation by governments while reducing compliance costs for the corporation. This approach seeks to develop self-regulation within an organisation based on environmental policy, goals, performance targets, plans, monitoring and review leading to continuous improvement. A properly implemented EMS can offer the regulator the potential for 'light-touch' regulation (Gunningham, 2009a) .
Studies assessing the environmental performance of companies certified to ISO 14001 and EMAS report variable outcomes. However, an analysis of more than 3000 facilities regulated as major sources under the US Clean Air Act suggested that ISO 14001 certified facilities reduced their pollution emissions by more than non-certified facilities even after controlling for a range of variables (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b) . A study of 316 US electronic facilities showed that the companies that adopted ISO 14001 decreased their toxic emissions and the longer they operated under ISO 14001 the lower the emissions (Russo, 2009 ). Other studies also suggest that a properly implemented EMS can deliver significant improvements in environment performance (Rondinelli and Vastag, 2000; Melnyk et al., 2003; Potoski and Prakash, 2005a) .
As a requirement of EMS or to complement it, many large corporations have strengthened risk assessment and management and engaged in corporate sustainability assessment and reporting and stakeholder engagement (Gunningham and Graboski, 1998) .
A number of other voluntary and self-regulatory programmes exist but the outcomes for environmental protection are mixed (Potoski and Prakash, 2004) . Some seek to develop a flexible, cost-effective and more autonomous alternative to direct regulation. At the other end of the spectrum, some appear to be an attempt to avoid the imposition of binding standards (Gunningham, 2009a) . The chemical industry launched the Responsible Care programme in 1985 in the aftermath of the 1984 Bhopal disaster. It now operates in 52 countries and members account for almost 90% of total global chemicals production (ICCA, 2006) . The aim of this selfregulatory programme is to encourage continuous improvement in health, safety and environmental performance among its members (ICCA, 2006) . However some studies suggest it has added little additional value to environmental protection (King and Lenox, 2000) . Further it is claimed that it is intended to be seen as a response to public concerns about environmental, health and safety practices in the chemicals industry while opposing stronger legislation and regulation of chemical products (Givel, 2007) .
Some voluntary environmental programmes (VEPs) do not require participants to improve their environmental performance. In other cases where programmes prescribe obligations, they are not enforced. Participants in the U.S. Department of Energy's Climate Wise programme are reported to have not improved their environmental performance (Welch et al., 2000) . In contrast, organisations that joined the US EPA 35/50 voluntary programme reduced their emissions of toxic pollutants by more than those that did not (Khanna and Damon, 1999 ). An extensive review of VEPs that target pollution from production processes in the US found they do not incrementally yield significant environmental improvement (Koehler, 2007) . Harrison (2001) found that the environmental benefits of voluntary programmes have almost certainly been exaggerated.
Although there is clear evidence of the successful use of a range of voluntary environmental instruments by some leaders in the corporate sector, there are also many cases of actions contrary to environmental protection where some in the corporate sector see their interests potentially threatened by proposed government legislation. In some cases these have taken the form of responsible, overt and transparent opposition to action and in other cases to disinformation campaigns, most clearly in recent years in relation to global warming (Oreskes and Conway, 2010 ).
Internationalisation
There has been an evolution of the awareness of the scale of atmospheric environment issues. Several decades ago the priorities were perceived to be predominantly local, for example health and nuisance concerns about emissions of smoke and sulphur dioxide from industrial facilities. With time national challenges emerged for example involving uniform national regulations for vehicle emissions, industrial facilities and hazardous pollutants. International dimensions became prominent in the 1980s and 1990s with issues such as long range transport of air pollutants in Europe and North America. Concerns increased in Japan about the transport of acid gases from China. South East Asian countries were alarmed by health effects of particulate matter transported from forest burning in Indonesia.
This evolution in the scale of issues was reciprocated by the scale of government responses. Initially, atmospheric environment issues were local matters best managed at a local level. With time the scale of these challenges required the formation of national environmental institutions that required broader and stronger powers to address the causal factors. When major atmospheric environment issues became international and global in scale and no individual country was able to address them acting alone, international or global agreements were negotiated. Some of these agreements, for example, the protocols under the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and National Emission Ceiling Directives of the EU required commitments to emissions reduction targets, harmonised monitoring and reporting by participating countries. These international agreements have partially reduced the sovereignty and flexibility of national governments to direct, control and regulate. They require national emissions data that were once considered to be extremely sensitive to be made available to other members of the Convention and selected information is made available to the public in publications of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the European Commission. They require collective decision-making and difficult changes in national policies and procedures (Williams, 2004) . The public availability of targets and reporting embedded in many international agreements increased transparency in delivering on atmospheric environment policies.
The high level of mobility of capital coupled with growing global markets has enabled companies to invest in production in countries where products can be most cheaply manufactured. This has the potential to increase emissions in rapidly industrialising countries. The relationship between emissions of air pollutants and level of economic development has been investigated using the concept of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) (Hettige et al., 1998) .
The concept of the EKC includes that emissions to the atmosphere are small in countries with a low level of economic development. As a national economy grows, industrialisation and use of energy and transport increase and consequently emissions of air pollutants also increase. This continues until the resources, expertise, technology, information, political and market pressures are deployed to reduce emissions.
A number of studies have tried to quantify the tipping points at which annual emissions of some air pollutants decline after a decade or two of increases. For example Selden and Song (1994) estimated that the EKC tipping point for sulphur dioxide (SO2) was USD 8000 per capita (in 1985 USD), for suspended particulate matter (SPM) it was USD 9000 per capita and for nitrogen oxides it was USD 9000 per capita. Stern (2004) reported that the tipping points were reducing. A study of Asian cities using slightly different techniques suggested much lower tipping points of about USD 1100 per capita for SO2, SPM and PM10, USD 500 per capita for carbon monoxide (CO) (Peters, 2009) . No tipping points were found for ozone or nitrogen dioxide. The reduction in tipping points for SO2, SPM, PM10 and CO may be evidence of developing countries adopting pollution control regulations at an earlier stage of development (Stern, 2004; Peters, 2009 ).
There is considerable complexity in the relationship between the opening of international markets and emissions to the atmosphere. For example, there is considerable discussion about the potential for the increasing mobility of capital and production to encourage some companies to relocate high emissions production facilities from countries with high emissions standards to countries with low standards to reduce costs (the pollution haven hypothesis) (Cole, 2004) . This is commonly argued as a basis to oppose the imposition of a price on carbon dioxide emissions in an absence of binding international emissions agreements. The potential for economic development to be harmed by more stringent regulatory standards by driving production to other countries and deter new investment is considered to have led to a 'regulatory chill', reducing emissions standards or reducing enforcement to attract or retain investment with lower compliance costs than competitors. This is the 'race to the bottom' hypothesis.
There is little evidence to support this 'race to the bottom' hypothesis in air quality (Wheeler, 2001; Busse, 2004) . A study of air quality policies among states in the US provided no evidence of a 'race to the bottom'. In contrast it showed that in several air quality policy areas states had chosen to exceed minimum US EPA criteria and none of the measures representing economic pressures for lowering environmental standards achieved statistical significance (Potoski, 2001) . A study of 119 countries based on five highly polluting industries found no evidence to support the pollution haven hypothesis with the possible exception of iron and steel products (Busse, 2004) . While marketisation and decentralisation have led to increased emissions of air pollutants economic globalisation has been beneficial to urban air quality in China (He et al., 2012) .
Pollution control costs are not a major determinant of location (Vogel, 1995; Wheeler, 2001; Cole et al., 2005) . When a multinational company is deciding where to locate a major production facility it pays more attention to issues such as physical and human capital, market access, political risk and essential infrastructure than the stringency of local environ-mental regulations. In addition, external stakeholders, including local communities in developing countries are not passive. As their incomes, education levels and access to information improve they act to protect their own interests and exert political pressure to reduce pollution consistent with the EKC theory (Wheeler, 2001; Daniere and Takahashi, 2002) .
Although there is frequent public comment about the harmful effects of tighter emissions regulations on national economic competiveness there is considerably more evidence for an opposing concept of a 'race to the top' in the US and EU (Vogel, 1995; Wijen et al., 2012) . Where countries or states adopt more stringent standards they are later copied by neighbouring countries and states (Wijen et al., 2012) . Vogel (1995) called this the 'California Effect', a ratcheting up of regulatory standards in competing jurisdictions. California has had stricter vehicle emissions standards than the rest of the US since the 1970s. In 1990 the US Congress brought national emissions standards up to the California standards and California adopted yet stricter standards. Subsequently 12 Eastern states adopted the new California standards (Vogel, 1995) . More stringent environmental regulations can cause companies to innovate leading to a greater international competitive advantage (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) .
Market pressures are also important. Market pressures for standardisation of production result in all new vehicles destined for the US market and some other markets being designed to achieve the California vehicles emissions stan-dards (Frankel, 2008) . Trade agreements and importers may require imported goods to meet specific emissions standards. As countries are permitted under World Trade Organisation rules to ban non-compliant imports, exporting countries have an incentive to re-engineer their products to meet the standards of importing countries. Companies may lobby their own governments to adopt domestic vehicle emissions standards similar to their highly regulated export markets to allow them to benefit from economies of scale by producing a single product for domestic and export markets and to gain a commercial advantage over competitors on the domestic markets lacking the compliance capacity (Perkins and Neumaye, 2012 ). An example is the process by which Germany successfully exerted pressure on the European Commission (EC) during the 1980s to adopt more stringent vehicle emission standards. The German vehicle manufacturers were major exporters to the higher regulated US market and already producing vehicles compliant with the more stringent emission standards. Raising emissions standards throughout the EU gave German companies a competitive advantage at least in the short term over some of their competitors (Perkins and Neumaye, 2012) .
Discussion
The policy processes relating to atmospheric environmental issues are in transition, particularly in developed countries as the traditional structures and processes of government-centred policy leadership are unsuitable for the third generational challenges, such as climate change. The influence of a number of factors both in their individual effects and their synergistic interactions represent a transformational change:
1. the move away from traditional regulation and towards a greater role for soft forms of policy coordination; 2. the greater use of an integrated and comprehensive approach to atmospheric environmental issues; 3. the growing influence of stakeholders; 4. the growing internationalisation of atmospheric environmental issues; and, 5. the strengthening of corporate environmental policies and management systems.
Regulatory tools so successfully used in developed countries to address the first generation atmospheric environmental issues such as smoke, sulphur dioxide, and lead emissions from vehicles (UNEP, 2012) are much less suitable to address the third generation challenges such as emissions of carbon dioxide and other climate forcing agents including methane, black carbon and tropospheric ozone. Many of the drivers of these complex issues are fragmented across a range of government agencies or outside of the control of individual governments. They are highly inter-related and will unfold over decades, well beyond the political life of a government. This evolution in issues is less clear in most developing and transitional countries where the first generation challenges pose direct and immediate threats to human health, the economy and environment. Consequently the first generation issues remain a major priority. At a global level there is a variety of opinions expressed by governments about the causes, severity, priority, urgency and policies needed to address the third generation challenges, so a consensus on globally agreed actions is currently rare, impeding significant implementation programmes (Jabbour et al., 2012) .
There is a lack of communication between science and policy on atmospheric environment issues most clearly seen in the failure to implement policies based on what science has revealed. For example, in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process the growing scientific research on the atmosphere is providing substantial knowledge and translating it into policy-relevant information. This near consensus of scientists supported by powerful evidence is meeting the inertia of the global atmospheric environment policy-making process (Jabbour et al., 2012) .
The failure of government-centred policy processes to effectively address the most pressing atmospheric environmental issues has led to efforts to find new institutions, partnerships and governance mechanisms (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006) . The increasingly fractured policy landscape has resulted in a loss of power and authority by government agencies (Papadopoulos, 2007) . They have become more reliant on persuasion and diplomacy in their relations with stakeholders and become increasingly managers of the policy process (Hey, 2006) . Government agencies are important to coordinate and possibly to help steer the direction of policy processes but they are no longer as centrally positioned as they were in previous decades. Governance has become more complex, multilevel from local to global and polycentric.
This analysis identifies that new multilevel, networks of partners may offer an alternative model to address some complex atmospheric environmental issues. In principle, the advantages are: they can integrate information across a wide range of fields including science, technology, social science and policy areas; they are not constrained by the obligations of government officials to represent their agency's policies or sectoral interests; they can innovate and flexibly respond to the challenges with integrated approaches; and there is an opportunity to integrate information from different scales from local to global and provide for actions at appropriate scales. The challenge is to effectively implement the outcomes of these governance networks. To date they have had mixed success and considerably more investigation is needed to evaluate and amend these new systems (Gunningham, 2009b) .
A reason for the mixed success may relate to the issues of scale. While some outcomes may be implemented at a local scale by a partnership of local stakeholders, other issues need the participation of the government agencies to provide the legitimacy, legal authority and resources for effective implementation (Jordan et al., 2005) . Although in theory the new governance processes may be suitable to address complex issues involving many stakeholders and decision points, to date these arrangements have been more successful with relatively simple air pollution issues at a confined scale, for example local, with a small number of participants than those involving complex issues with unclear boundaries and many stakeholders (Gunningham, 2009b) . More optimistically, another analysis suggests that a higher number of agencies and levels of governance involved in decision-making is correlated with a higher quality of environmental policy outputs (Newig and Fritsch, 2009) .
A second issue appears to be the role of the government agencies. Where the regulator is an active participant and there is a credible enforcement provision in the arrangements they have been more successful than 'purer' forms of networked governance (Gunningham, 2009b) . This suggests offering the carrot but keeping the stick.
